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When

I accepted a position at

Colorado

State University in 1969, I carried this same
ambivalence West.
For my first five or six
years in Colorado, I worked primarily in
areas which were oonsistent with Eastern
academic values, though I was fortunate to be
wri ting my dissertation under Professor Arthur Danto (probably the llOst brilliant and
broad ranging mind I have ever known) , who
encouraged me to cut my own path.
My interests at that time centered around pulosofhy
of language, theory of meaning, and history
of philosofhY,
philosofhy, primarily Hume and Kant.
(I
had studied the latter pulosofhers as a Fulbright Fellow in 1964-65 at Edinburgh, under
Professors G. E. Davie and W. H. Walsh.) By
1976, I had published Natural and Conventional Meaning:
An Examination clthe Distinction, a series of articles in~ ~iety of
areas, and in a masochistic scholarly frenzy
edited, translated, and annotated The PortRayal Granmar with a CSU colleague. Ja<XI\les
Rieux. By 1976, I was on the verge of prOl1Otion to full professor.
My only work in the
animal area had been in 1969, when, follCMing
my childhood concerns, I wrote off to a dozen
or so publishers suggesting that we undertake
an anthology dealing with human obligations
to other animals.
When no one even nibbled
at this suggestion, I laid it aside, figuring
that the whole idea was just too deviant for
the mainstream academic ccmnunity.

Even as a child,

I recall wondering why
societies and animal "shelters"
''humane"
spent IOC>St of their time and effort "putting
to sleep" healthy dogs and cats.
The official "for their own good" response (what a
friend of mine nastily labels "preventive
death") didnt.t make a great deal of sense to
me, and so I -shrugged i t off, figuring that
this was yet another mystery which would be
resolved when I grew up, along with other
insoluble questions like where pencils came
frem and disa~ed to, and how dirty jokes
came into existence.
Although I am now presumable "grawn up," I have not yet received
adequate answers to any of these questions.
Perhaps, like particularly thorny questions
of Talmudic ~ , resolution awaits the
coming of the (Jewish) Messiah.
In any case, although I retained an
interest
in
animals
and
in questions
surrounding their llOral status, this interest
was clearly demarcated fran my academic concerns during my undergraduate and graduate
years at CCNY and Columbi~.
I emerged fran
Columbia, as did m:my other young academics,
in a rather curious frame of mind.
On the
one had, I felt thoroughly overawed by my
professors; totally ineffectual, obsequiously
grateful that I had not been thrown out of
pulosofhY, chronically guilty, cxmnitted to
carrying the same ethos to whatever institution I went, determined to make it along
accepted lines and hating myself for all of
the above.
On the other hand, part of me
rebelled against allowing myself to be cast
into such a IIOld and buying into the whole
Eastern Ivy League treadmill.
Resp:mding to
these suffocating pressures in a m:mner consistent with my heritage, I developed severe
chronic ast:.hm:l, which gave me the excuse to
leave New York in search of breathable air
for the body and a breathable atITOsfhere for
the soul.

Had I been anywhere else but CSU, that
may well have been the end of my attempt to
deal with these issues in any formal way.
But the situation at CSU was sufficiently
unique that, happily, this did not occur.
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In eight years of teaching and writing in the
history of pulosorhY, I had found virtually
nothing addressing the grounds for excluding
animals fran the scope of rcoral concern.
Philosorhers had rcostly neglected the issue
in their writings on ethics.
Furtherrcore, I
found that most pulosorhers tended to demarcate humans fran animals by virtue of the
fact that humans possessed language.
I saw
no rcoral relevance in this claim and in my
work on meaning had becane convinced that
there was, in fact, no difference in kind
between human language and natural signs.

First of all, the CSU pulosolny department
was probably the rcost congenial atrcosrhere an
academic could ever hope for. '!he department
of eighteen people had been created by Professor Willard O. Eddy during the expansionary 1960's.
Eddy, a University of Chicago
product. was determined to =eate a firstrate deparbnent while avoiding the pressures
which pervaded rcost excellent institutions.
In order to do so, he first of all hired
young Ph.D. 's and alrcost Ph.D. 's only fran
institutions--Yale,
Columbia,
Chicago,
Princeton,
Michigan, Stanford, &linburgh,
Minnesota--when rcost other departments at CSU
were hiring fran the mid-West alone. Second,
he hired for congeniality and collegiality as
much as for intellect.
'!hird, he urged his
people to do their own thing, regardless of
current pulosopucal fads.
Fourth, he encouraged department members to devote at
least part of their time to what is today
called "applied pulosorhY," which he saw as
a Socratic function of primary importance in
a land grant school, only lately becare a
university. '!he result was a truly unique
department in which everyone attended everyone else' <:: paper-readings, respected and read
one another's work, engaged in regular dialogue, and virtually split their salaries
equally.
Out of this atrcosrhere came what
has been described by administrators as a
"world-class" pulosorhY department, a number
of whose members enjoy international reputations in such diverse areas as envirornnental
ethics, Zoroastrian studies, rhilosorhy of
psychology, and animal rights.

When approached by the veterinarian, I
realized what a golden opportunity I was
being offered.
Here was a chance to develop
my ethical ideas in the context of a group
whose raison d'etre was the health and wel-----fare of animals, yet who had absolutely no
articulated awareness of the rcoral questions
underlying their profession.
Here, too, was
a chance to weld theory and practice and to
effect real change.
(In my view, then as
nCM, applied pulosorhY is merely wheelspinning i f it does not result in practical
differences. )
At the same time, getting the veterinary
college to accept such a course, which might
well subvert much of their accepted practice,
was no easy task. Doubtless through the good
offices of God, I chanced to catch one of the
junior faculty rcenbers of the veterinary
college attempting to do unnecessary rrajor
surgery on my own dog in order to provide an
interesting case for the students.
Under
threat of grievous bodily harm, he confessed
that he had lied to me, claiming that he had
been trained to do anything at all to get the
client "off his back." With this lucky incident as a lever, I was able to convince Dr •
William Tietz, then Dean of the Veterinary
School, to institute the course on an experimental basis.
'!hat he did, and immediately
left to becarre president of ~tana state
University, leaving his successor, Dr. Robert
Phemister, saddled with me and the course.
Fortunately, Dr. Phemister is a man of deep
rcoral concern, with a strong liberal education and a deep camtitment to educating--not
merely training--veterinarians.
Under his
aegis, the course went srooothly in one year
fran an experiment into a required part of
the veterinary curricultnn.

By 1976, I was feeling a great need to
change my intellectual direction,
having
becane sarrewhat restless with traditional
academic concerns.
My "applied" work in the
department had been in human medical ethics,
and in the early 1970's, I had successfully
developed what I believe is one of the first
undergraduate courses in ethical and pulosorhical issues in medicine ever done in the
United States.
In 1975, I was approached by
Dr. Harold Breen, Professor of Pathology in
the School of Veterinary Medicine, who asked
i f I were willing to undertake a similar
project for veterinary students, sarething
which had never before been done.
After
giving his suggestion a bit of thought, it
occurred to me that the fundamental questions
for veterinary ethics surely revolved around
the rcoral status of animals.
At the same
time, my old interest in ethics and animals
had been rekindled by my work in the theory
of meaning and in the history of rhilosorhY.

As the first day of class approached, I
was wracked with doubts. 'lbere was no precedent for such a course, no texts to fall back
on, no previous syllabi.
Furtherrcore, uni-
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in any veterinary school, the students en
masse objected to the practice.
Although
IID.lch of the faculty was hostile to the idea
of students doing anything but ticking off
multiple choices, rrany faculty members were

versity folklore depicted veterinary students
as very bright troglodytes; red-necks, exMboy
shitkickers with no respect for prre science,
let alone for philosophy.
Fortunately, Dean
Phemister had presciently suggested that I
take as a co-teacher Dr. Harry Gorman, Assistant Dean, former chief veterinarian for the
Aerospace Program, inventor of the artificial
hip joint, and one of the great figures in

not and, like Drs.
Gorman and Phemister,
had, on reflection, deep reservations about
doing such a thing simply for ea:manic expediency.
As a result, CSU became the first
veterinary school to abolish multiple survival surgery on rroral grounds, and set an
example which rrost veterinary schools were to
follow in the next half dozen years.

American veterinary medicine.
six hours of
intellectual sparring with Harry convinced me
that he was a superb dialectician, a rrorally
concerned individual, and, rrost linportant, a
figure authoritative enough to prevent my
being lynched by the students.

Shortly after the course was established, I began to receive invitations to lecture
at other veterinary colleges and to help them
institute programs in ethics until, by 1984,
I had lectured at alrrost three-fourths of the
veterinary schools in the U.S. and canada. I
also began to publish papers in veterinary
journals, arguing for such courses as well as
for veterinary concern for animal rights.
Though I had been warned repeatedly that
veterinary medicine was still very exploitative in its way of looking at animals, reflecting its agricultural roots, I have found
veterinarians and veterinary schools very
supportive of my work. nus did not surprise
me--I have always operated on the assumption
that the vast majority (probably 85%) of the
people who choose to becane veterinarians--by
no means a lucrative profession nor an easy
life--do so because they care deeply about
animals and seem them as possessed of intrinsic value, not merely instrumental or economic value.
As I tell my veterinary audiences, the situation is easily characterized in
Socratic terms:
as a philosopher, I cannot
teach-cannot force rroral concern upon them-at rrost, I can help them remember I recollect,
and give systematic expression to that rroral
concern which, in an intuitive way, brought
them to the field in the first place, but
which gets buried and forgotten through pressures of econcmics,
practicality, habit,
peer-pressure,
and an educational system
designed to produce a trained and predictable
corps of "professiCX1als."

On the first day of class,
I planned to
approach the students in a straightforward
way, challenging them to articulate their
rroral ideas, criticizing their education as
rote Ire!lOrization and Marine Corps
type
spoon-feeding which, as one faculty member
cordially told !le, was aimed at producing
"not thinking men, but professional veterinarians."
This I did at that initial meeting, but not before all my pent-up anxiety
burst forth in what turned out to be a salubrious cleaning of the air.

As I began to lecture, I noticed four
cow'ocJys in the back of the rocrn--hats on,
chewing tobacco, boots perched on the desk in
front of them, smirking at me and making
sotto ~ cracks arrong themselves.
sanething snapped in me, and I turned on them.
"Look, " I thundered, "I know you guys are
taking nineteen required hours, that you have
tons of work, and that the last thing you
think you need is sane goddamn hippie New
York Jew pinko-camri.e philosopher bullshitling about right and wrong.
But if you listen real good, you might learn sanething,
because I'm a helluva lot brighter than you
and know a lot rrore science than you do.
And, in any case, if you don't wipe those
smirks off your faces, I'm going to take you
out in the hall and do it for you."
This
juvenile outburst was perfect-I had unwittingly approached them on familiar
macho
grounds and had gotten their attention.

I have, I believe, been very successful
in this area; rrore and rrore schools have
introduced these notions into their curricula; organized veterinary medicine has slowly
becane rrore concerned with animal welfare
issues; many odious practices, like multiple
surgery,
have been abolished; veterinary
educators and teachers have ~ far rrore
sensitive to the issues.
I am, of course,

Those students were extraordinary.
By
mid-year, they were convinced that the practice ccmrtDIl in virtually every veterinary and
medical school in the U.S. and canada of
using the same dog over and over for surgery
practice, scrnetines for as long as one year,
was rrorally, scientifically, and clinically
indefensible.
Ii1 what was certainly a first
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personally gratified by the frequent invitations I get to address local and state veterinary groups, as well as veterinary colleges,
and overwhelmingly find enthusiasm rather
than hostility for my ideas.
'Ihere is, of
course, much to be done, but I believe that
veterinary medicine has basically
becaTIe
concerned. In 1983, to my deep amazement and
gratitude, I was awarded the rare Veterinary
Service Award by the Colorado Veterinary
Medical Association for outstanding contributions to veterinary medicine.

ved with animal welfare must regularly ask
themselves i f the animals are any better off
in virtue of their efforts, or if they are
simply working in the area to feel virtuous,
pure, rebellious, or noble.
All too many
people forget about the animals while supporting a principle.
Anyone who thinks, for
example, that working toward the use of analgesia for lab animals is a sell-out and that
one ought to work only to abolish all animal
experimentation, has clearly forgotten what
it is like to hurt.

At the same time as I got involved with
the CSU veterinary college, another fateful
oc=ence which incalculably affected my
work in animal welfare transpired.
This was
the appointment of Dr. David H. Neil as Director
of Animal Care--laboratory animal
veterinarian--at CSU.
I first crashed into
his office one afternoon shortly after his
arrival to berate him about an animal use
proposal of his.
To my amazement, he listened; we argued, in fact, for nine hours,
until he finally conceded that I was right
and withdrew his proposal (perhaps as much
out of bladder pressure as intellectual pressure) •
In any event, I found him to be an
extraordinarily intelligent, sensitive, welleducated, philosophically sophisticated man,
deeply concerned about animals, who had always felt that animal welfare issues cried
out for rational, fililosophical treatment.
During his work with the Canadian Research
Council, in fact, he had tried unsuccessfully
to enlist the help of philosofilers, none of
whan at the time wished to sully themselves

At the same time, along with David Neil,
Gorman, and Robert Welbon1, a praninent
Denver attorney, I was engaged in drafting
what became the so-called Schroeder Bill on
laboratory animals, which subsequently became
the Walgren and Dole Bills.
'Ihe basic concept of the bill was to create legislation
which covered the actual conduct of research,
not just transportation, housing, etc., as
does the Animal Welfare Act,. and which c0vered all animals used in research and teaching.
(The Animal welfare Act exempts fran
its coverage rats and mice, who constitute
70% of the animals used in research, and farm
animals.) 'Ihe bill mandated the abolition of
multiple survival surgery and required control of pain not essential to the logic of an
experiment by anaesthesia and
analgesia.
(Laboratory animal analgesia is alrrost never
used in the U.S., especially an rodents,
though, ironically, all analgesics are tested
on rodents.) All of this was to be enforced
by local review carmittees analogous to those
which review research on human subjects.
At
least one member of the carmi ttee was to be
fran the a:mnunity, representing animal welfare interests.
In 1982, I testified before
Congress on behalf of the Walgren version of
the bill. Ironically, although no version of
the bill has yet been passed, and all versions were opposed by the National Institutes
of Health, in the spring of 1984, NIH itself
proposed guidelines for federally
funded
research institutions which essentially replicate rrost of the key features of the
Schroeder bill.

with empirical matters.
He offered me the
opportunity to work with him virtually on a
daily basis, on matters ranging fran running
a laboratory animal facility to educating
researchers about animal rights, to writing
meaningfully legislation to assure the welfare of laboratory animals, and I jumped at
the chance.
For the past eight years, I have worked
with David Neil and his people and have becare very knowledgeable in all aspects of
laboratory animal care and use; rrore knowledgeable, I am told by laboratory animal
veterinarians, than many researchers who use
animals.
This knowledge and experience has
given lte a great deal of credibility with
researchers and laboratory animal veterinarians and technicians, and I address groups of
them with great regularity.
Throughout my
dealings with Neil, he 'has repeatedly hamrrered away at the point that everyone invol-

Dr.

By the time that I testified before
Congress, it had becane very clear that a;1imal welfare issues were rapidly becaning a
major social concern.
Hundreds of bills had
been introduced at state, federal, and local
levels dealing with these issues.
And in
Europe and Canada, protests, laboratory seizures, and "trashings" were becaning camon
occurrences.
'Ihe old, sentimental, "humane"

ethic, characterizoo by primazy concern for
dogs and cats to the exclusion of less lovable animals, had been replacOO by a new
animal rights ethic, whose pranulgators were
better organizoo, better inforna:1, and more
activist.
starting in 1978, I was calloo
upon with ever-increasing frequency to speak
and consult for animal welfare groups in the
U.S. and canada. Of great mutual benefit was
my work with Drs. Michael Fox and Andrew
Rowan of the Institute for the Study of Animal Problens, and my regular consultations
for Mr. Neil Jotham of the canadian Fooeration of Humane Societies.
I am currently
working with CFHS on a proposal to elevate
the legal status of animals above that of
property, and we have recently sutrnittoo a
brief to this effect to the Canadian Law
Reform Ccmni.ssion.

for human benefit and the moral onus upon
researchers to maximize the welfare of the
animals that they use.
I have made these
points repeatedly in publishoo papers and in
my 1981 book, Animal Rights and Human I>brali~
(Pranetheus Books), which was written to
provide both animal welfare advocates and
scientists with a rational and practicable
point of departure for discussing the general

At the Congressional hearing on the
walgren Bill, it was clear that I and others
had made sane rational headway with the scientific camn.mity.
'!he Alrerican Veterinary
Medical
Association endorsoo the Walgren
Bill, and I personally carrioo the endorserrent of the Alrerican Physiological Society,
historically the traditional opponent of any
external intrusion into the research process,
and the endorsement of a variety of research
institutions.
Fatal opposition to the bill
~
primarily fran the human medical research cem:nunity , whose manbers are usoo to
doing pretty much as they please and who have
displayoo no sensitivity whatever to this
issue, being content to mouth irrelevant
platitudes like "animal research yields hmuan
benefits," to list tirre-worn examples of
these benefits, and to pose a false dichotomy
between animal welfare and hmuan welfare. (I
once debatoo the head of the National Society
for Medical Research, who proceedoo to tell
the astonishoo audience that 45 Nobel Prize
winners had usoo animals in their research,
therefore, all researchers had the right to
do what they wish to animals and that, in any
case, nothing questionable is done to any
animal in any medical or veterinary school in
the U.S.)
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issue of animal rights and human moral abligations to animals, as well as many specific
welfare issues.
I hopOO to provide cx:mron
grolIDd for both sides to engage in dialogue
and to make things better for the animals.
The book has sold well and has in general
been well-reviewed by both sides in dozens of
journals.
(It was, in fact, name:j best academic book of the year in the general category by the Alrerican Association of Uni versity Libraries. ) I say "in general," because
it has also garneroo sane outrageous responses.
I was calloo a "Nazi" and a "labtrasher" by a reviewer in the New England
Journal of Medicine, which also refusoo to
print my response to this scurrilous document.
On the other side, I was calloo a

In my speeches before medical and other
researchers, I have trioo to derronstrate the
haJ:nony between proper treatment of animals
and the goals of good research, citing many
examples of research renderoo useless by a
failure to control for stress variables and
for the P'lysiological effects of pain, fear,
anxiety, etc.
I also eng;X1asize the moral
obligations entailoo by animal research done
BE:IWErn 'mE SPEX::IES

"r
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sopucal questions, incltrling animal rights
questions, are inseparably part of the very
essence of science and ought to be learned by
nascent scientists along with roore traditional empirical material. I also teach a course
for animal science students on ethical issues
in intensive animal agriculture and have
found these students, contrary to stereotypes, to be aroong the brightest, roost sensitive, and roost roorally concerned students I
have ever enCOillltered.
I am currently at
work coordinating a course for graduate students who use animals, dealing not only with
animal issues in animal research but also
with nuts and bolts techniques, such as handling, analgesia, and euthanesia, which, if
not anployed properly, can engender untold
aroounts of suffering for animals.

"sell-out" for "accepting the reality of
science" by a leading animal activist };lli>lication.
Truly, the animal welfare issue brings
out the craziness which lies dornant in roost
of us, primarily, I am convinced, because
animals are not a constituency and have no
voice with which to press for meaningful
reforms.
As a result, both sides can get as
extreme and self-indulgent as they wish. Too
often, scientists tend to deny that there is
a problem, while "humaniacs" engage in karnikaze campaigns directed at activities they
only dimly understand.
Being in the middle,
I have, predictably, often borne the brunt of
this lunacy.
After I gave a speech advocating reason in the rooverrent at one humane
organization, a senior officer of the organization
becaIre illlcontrollably enraged and
later told the group that they "didn't need
reason or Jew logic" in the organization,
only "enotion and Christian ethics."
At a
scientific meeting where I had been invited
to give an hour-long, after"""ili.nner speech a
year in advance, the president of the society
would not shake my hand and told me not to
speak for longer than fifteen minutes "because no one will listen to you for any
longer than that."
I have been told roore
than once that it is fortilllate that I am
large (225 lbs.), strong (I am a weightlifter and sane time ago bench-pressed over
500 lbs.), and mean, and enjoy a welldeserved rePJtation for quick, nasty, and
deadly canebacks.

A great deal of my time is spent in
dialogue with faculty who use animals, learning their concerns and problems and attempting to sensitize them to rooral questions by
giving
giVing such provocative lectures as "The
PhilosoIiler and the Ct::M's Rectum," which was
very well-attended.
I
am constantly in
search of scientists and veterinarians who,
as it were, take naturally to these issues,
for it is they who can best build awareness
of these questions into the fabric of scientific activity and education.
I have been
fortunate to find a fair number of such pe0ple all across the country, but I seem especially blessed at CSU.
My Colleagues in
the sciences have been wonderfully receptive
to my critiques of current practice and have,
in fact, appointed me jointly in the Department of Physiology and Biophysics. One of my
best students, Dr. M. L. Kesel, a true Renaissance person, is now anployed as a laboratory animal veterinarian with David Neil and
has denonstrated a unique ability to integrate science and ethics.
She, in tum, is
now involved in teaching others, and so it
grC1iiS.

Over the years, I have becx:xne convinced
the basis of my own experience that the
best hope for animals canes fran education
and legislation, where legislation primarily
serves an educational filllction to present
rooral concern for animals "writ large." Most
people, be they scientists, animal welfare
advocates, or members of the };lli>lic, are
woefully ignorant of the conceptual, rooral,
and scientific aspects of issues pertaining
to the place and treatment of animals in
society.
'Ihis is not surprising, since so
few of these issues are ever fonnally examined even in the best ill1iversities.
The
najor thrust of my own activity, I suppose,
has been to create academic respectability
and academic housing for these questions as a
vehicle for social change.
In addition to
the veterinary course, I team-teach a oneyear freshman honors biology course at csu
with Dr. lollrray Nabors, where We are cemni tted to showing students that rooral and puloon

My animal-related activities have grown
beyond anything I foresaw eight years ago.
To date, I have done in excess of 300 lectures all over the U.S., canada, and Europe,
fran Poland to Britain, to groups ranging
fran attorneys to trauma researchers to psychologists
and zoologists, and average at
least 25 trips each year.
I have engaged in
debates, given keynote speeches, presented
endowed lectures, delivered graduation addresses, testified before legislatures, held
seminars for goverrunent agencies, appeared on
television and radio and in documentaries,
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been featured in magazines, and helped develop courses of study.
I have seen people at

their stupidest and nnst intransigent, yet I
have also, en many occasions, seen the efficacy of reason and witnessed the tritnnP1 of
decency over self-interest.
In the midst of
all of this tumult, I have been fortunate,
indeed, to enjoy the security of a stable
hare life and have benefitted fran living
with a wife and son (born in 1979), both of
whan are considerably brighter than I am.
(By the time my wife, a matherratician, has
finished going over my papers and speeches
and rubbed my nose in every conceptual flaw,
I am IOClrally certain all my bases are covered
and am prepared to face anyone.) My little
boy has attended my speeches and lectures so
often that he has only to hear the word
"ethical" and he falls instantly aaleep.
When I gave the C. W. H~ Meirorial Lecture
at Kings College, London, in fact, he sat
erect in the first rCM, much to the amazement
of the audience, apparently absorbed in the
lecture, and slept quietly fran the first
sentence on, to be awakened only by the applause, in which he enthusiastically took
part.
For the i.rrrnediate future, I anticipate
working primarily on the treatment of animals
in science, not because there aren't other
areas of pressing concern, but because it is
the area I knCM best.
Then, too, despite
frequent lapses, scientists are professionally coumitted to abiding by the rule of reason
and are, thus, amenable to rational and scientific persuasion. Where profits and bottan
line are, as it were, the bottan line, as in
animal agriculture or in horse-racing, rational argument is obviously not the IOClst
effective force for change.
In addition to the all-import-...ant IOClral
dimension, it seems clear to me that the
issue of animal use in science teaches us
much about the nature of science. For if, as
scientists frequently say, contemporary bioIT¥3di.cine is essentially dependent on invasive
use of animals, surely they cannot also claim
as part of the ideology of science that science is value-free, since every such invasive
use of animals presupposes the m:>ral judgment
that the benefit gained by science is of
greater value than or trumps the animal pain
or suffering.
Also, the scientist's ability
to ignore the camon sense demands of IOClrality when dealing with laboratory animals is
itself a fascinating fhenanenon, based in
part upon a widespread notion integral to the

ideology of science that one can make no
judgments about animal feelings and awareness
and that imputatien of consciousness to animals is anthropaInqilic and scientifically
meaningless.
This in t.urn leads to bizarre
Cartesian claims that ani.mcls don't really
feel pain; they cnly "vocalize" or "ShCM
aversive behavior. n My nnst recent work is
designed to confute the orthodox view that
claims about animal minds are meaningless and
to ShCM that it was basically an indefensible
historical accident, inconsistent with fundamental biological premises, but pragmatically
expedient, which led to a denial of mentation
to animals.
In this way, I hope not only to
change the scientific gestalt on animal consciousness but to shed light on the less than
rational manner in which scientific change
takes place.
As the concept of local and public review of animal research gains credence, people will becc:ire increasingly aware, as, indeed, they have in the human research area,
that IOClral deliberations are not bull-sessions
and do not take place in a vacuum.
This, I
hope, will in turn ensure that the tissue of
questions surrounding these IOClral
issues
about animals will becane the object of serious study and research and, correlatively,
receives academic respectability and a place
for study in institutions of higher learning.
cnly in this way can such issues becane a
permanent and legitimate area of enIfhasis in
a democratic society.
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